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Abstract 
The present study examines the role of emotion in the self-critical process of individuals with 
anger problems. Self-criticism is a prevalent intra-personal feature which greatly impacts an 
individual's emotion. So far, it is unclear, which emotions individuals with maladaptive anger 
experience when they work through their self-criticism. Using a quasi-experimental design, 
the present study compared n = 23 anger-prone under-graduate students to n = 22 controls on 
process indices of contempt, fear, shame, anger, and global distress, as well as on their access 
to underlying need, as participants were working through personalized self-critical content. 
This was achieved using a single-session enactment from emotion-focused therapy, 
augmented with a standardized procedure for priming participants to focus on their unmet 
needs. Findings suggested that this work on self-criticism reduced for both groups distress, 
fear and shame, as well as increased assertive anger (McNemar tests significant at p = .05). 
More centrally, anger-prone individuals expressed more self-contempt (t(1, 44) = 3.65; p < 
.05), and they had more difficulty in accessing their underlying need (χ2 = 5.35; p < .05), 
when compared to controls. These results have implications for clinical work with anger-
prone individuals, and clarify key features in the use of enactment interventions when 
working towards emotional resolution. The present study also demonstrates the use of 
personalized stimuli in the context of clinically relevant quasi-experimental research on 
emotional processes. 
Key-Words: Self-Criticism; Anger; Emotion Processing; Experimental; Contempt; Need 
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The role of maladaptive anger in self-criticism:  
A quasi-experimental study on emotional processes 
 Self-criticism is a self-referential process that is significantly associated with a number 
of psychological disorders. It refers to the individual applying a "conscious evaluation of 
oneself that can be healthy and reflexive behavior, but also can have harmful effects and 
consequences for an individual" (Kannan & Levitt, 2013, p. 166). These harmful effects may 
involve being harsh and condemning, expressing hatred, contempt and loathing towards 
oneself. In the context of help seeking individuals, self-criticism is believed to impact the 
quality of otherwise strong therapeutic relationships (Whelton, Paulson, & Marusiak, 2007), 
undermining one’s interaction with an attending clinician (Shahar, 2004).  
Self-criticism has been conceptualized within cognitive models as a specific form of 
self-referential mode of information-processing that is characterized by its relentlessness, and 
its hypercritical and punitive nature (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979). Cognitive models 
have also conceptualized it in terms of negative thoughts and maladaptive schemas (Beck et 
al., 1979; Schmidt & Joiner, 2004). Research on self-criticism has also explored it as a trait 
aspect of personality (Mongrain, 1993), as well as a correlate of interpersonal behaviors, such 
as quarrelsomeness (Kopala-Sibley, Rappaport, Sutton, Moskowitz, & Zuroff, 2013; Sadikaj, 
Moskowitz, Russell, Zuroff & Paris, 2013; Zuroff, Moskowitz & Côté, 1999). Finally, 
neuroimaging studies have explored the biological underpinnings of self-criticism lending 
some support to the cognitive framework (Longe, Maratos, Gilbert, Evans, Volker, Rockliff, 
et al., 2010; Doerig, Schlumpf, Spinelli, Späti, Brakowski, Quednow et al., 2013): these 
studies were able to identify specific patterns of neural activation related to self-critical 
processes.  
However, the cognitive or interpersonal perspectives on self-criticism are not 
sufficient to explain individuals’ emotional processes and reactions associated with self-
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criticism (Greenberg, 2002; Hooley, Siegle & Gruber, 2012; Whelton & Greenberg, 2005), 
they tend to lack the detailed description of the emotional or experiential response to the 
cognitive/interpersonal stimuli. Also, these conceptual frameworks do not enable one to study 
self-criticism as an unfolding process-state from one moment to the next, which is the closest 
to how it manifests in a treatment session. Research has suggested that emotional reaction to 
problematic experience is a multi-step process (e.g., Pascual-Leone & Greenberg, 2007), 
evolving from undifferentiated affective responses to more meaning-laden, differentiated and 
idiosyncratic constructions. In order to optimally observe such emotion changes, occurring as 
individuals work through their self-criticism, the use of imaginal dialogues has been 
suggested as a paradigm for collecting observational process-data (Whelton & Greenberg, 
2005). 
The role of maladaptive anger in self-criticism 
 Problematic (or maladaptive) anger is a common feature of a number of psychological 
disorders, such as depression, eating disorders, complex trauma, social anxiety and 
personality disorders (e.g., Beck et al., 1979; Blatt, 2004; Dolhanty & Greenberg, 2009; 
Meares, Gerull, Stevenson, & Korner, 2011; Ogrodniczuk & Kealy, 2013; Paivio & Pascual-
Leone, 2010; Pos & Greenberg, 2012; Shahar, 2004; Shahar, Blatt, Zuroff, & Pilkonis, 2003). 
Emotion-focused theory offers a useful perspective for understanding maladaptive anger 
(Greenberg, 1990; Greenberg & Paivio, 1997; Pascual-Leone, Gillis, Singh and Andreescu, 
2013; Pascual-Leone and Greenberg, 2007). In this perspective, various forms of "rejecting" 
anger (one of which is contempt) can become entrenched and maladaptive, and these must be 
conceptually differentiated from more healthy and adaptive forms of "assertive" anger. A key 
discriminating feature in describing these sub-types of anger, is that rejecting anger is an 
aroused and expressive state where the meaning is not clear, whereas assertive anger can be 
understood as standing up for one's needs and inner convictions (see Pascual-Leone et al., 
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2013, for a detailed formulation of this in the context of psychotherapy). When anger is an 
issue of concern for individuals with psychological problems, it is usually expressed in terms 
of maladaptive (rejecting) anger, and/or with an undifferentiated state of reactive global 
distress. These emotional states are understood as secondary emotional reactions to more core 
primary emotional states (Greenberg & Paivio, 1997). For example, primary (assertive) anger 
is a freshly experienced, biologically adaptive emotional reaction in the service of an 
existential need, which usually relates to affirming aspects of one’s identity, self-worth, and 
survival. We assume that such a primary emotional reaction may emerge in particular when 
individual work productively through their self-criticism, but it remains hidden and 
unaccessed in less productive processes. 
A recent randomized controlled trial on treatment for clients with borderline 
personality disorder has empirically demonstrated the differentiation of these two categories 
of anger (Kramer, Pascual-Leone, Berthoud, de Roten, Marquet, Kolly, Despland, & Page, in 
press). According to a sequential model of how emotion is processed over time (Pascual-
Leone & Greenberg, 2007; Pascual-Leone, 2009), secondary emotions, such as maladaptive 
rejecting anger, are understood as important initial stepping stones in the process of emotional 
transformation, -- an often intermediate step in the access of primary emotions. For example, 
an individual may initially react to a situation of failure with secondary (rejecting anger) as 
part of a problematic reaction, by harshly accusing another person for the failure. Then, by 
progressively working through the experience, the same individual may access a more 
vulnerable aspect of the self related to shame, which contains identity related content (e.g., an 
existential need for being seen or recognized), which may in turn enable the individual to 
formulate and express assertive anger (i.e., a primary emotion) toward the resolution of 
emotional distress, which was initially triggered by personal failure. 
Using the imaginal dialogue task to study emotion in self-criticism 
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 A promising way to study the moment-by-moment process of working through self-
criticism is the use of lively two-chair enactments. Such lively in-session enactments are 
borrowed from the principles of emotion-focused and Gestalt therapy (Elliott, Watson, 
Goldman & Greenberg, 2004; Perls, Hefferline, & Goodman, 1951). Along with the liveliness 
(i.e., activated emotional content) associated with the idiosyncratic material being processed 
in two-chair dialogues (Shahar, Carlin, Engle, Hedge, Szepsenwol, & Arkowitz, 2012), this 
procedure helps to separate out two opposing “parts of the self” (sometimes referred to as 
“voices”) in the person involved in self-critical processes: the punishing “self-critic” and the 
often anxious or depressed “experiencing self” (Greenberg, 2002; Shahar, Carlin, Engle, 
Hegde, Szepsenwol & Arkowitz, 2012). The enactment of a dialogue is also helpful in 
studying change from both the perspective of a softening of the self-critical voice, and also 
from the perspective of deepening and exploring one’s emotional experience in reaction to the 
critic. 
Using two-chair enactments of this kind, Greenberg (1979) investigated the change 
process in decisional conflicts and demonstrated the importance of the separation into two 
distinct “voices” (i.e., sides of the conflit), the facilitation of the owning of the emotion 
associated with each voice, the facilitation of awareness of the process, the facilitation of the 
patient’s quality of experiencing and the support of the emotion expression. In particular, the 
voice quality related to each side of the emotional conflict as it was enacted, was central. For 
example, the resolution of the conflict was associated with the lessening of the harshness in 
the patient’s voice observed across time. Whelton and Greenberg (2005) focused on self-
criticism while investigating the emotional process of dysthymia by recruiting 60 
undergraduate students and asking them to engage in an imaginal dialogue that enacted their 
self-critical process. They found that the individuals with higher levels of dysthymia 
presented with more non-verbal (e.g., curled lip; Ekman & Friesen, 1976) and verbal (e.g., 
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insults) markers of self-contempt, as compared to a group of controls who did not have 
depressive features. As part of the experiential reaction to self-criticism, dysthymic 
individuals presented more shame and sadness, as well as an absence of pride, when 
compared to controls. Furthermore, contrary to what cognitive models would suggest, the 
groups did not significantly differ on the cognitive content of their self-criticisms. These 
observations led the authors to conclude that individuals who were more vulnerable to 
dysthymia and depression differed from those who are less vulnerable mostly on the 
emotional process underlying self-criticism (Greenberg, Elliott & Foerster, 1990; Whelton & 
Greenberg, 2005). While the study of dysthymia was revealing, the question remains open 
whether individuals suffering from maladaptive anger would differ in their self-critical 
process from those who are less anger-prone on emotional indices such as self-contempt or 
depressogenic process (i.e., shame, fear and emotional collapse). 
It was shown that the two-chair dialogue produced change in self-criticism and 
associated indices of emotional change. Shahar and colleagues (2012) conducted a short 
intervention using two-chair dialogues with nine women with problems related to self-
criticism and demonstrated the positive effects. Their results suggested that such enactment 
interventions may have a lasting impact on depressive symptoms, increasing the women’s 
capacity of self-compassion, and attenuating the intensity of self-criticism. 
The resolution of maladaptive anger was also examined using two-chair dialogues. 
Diamond, Rochman and Amir (2010) studied a sample of 29 women with maladaptive anger 
by offering a single-session intervention using two-chair dialogues, along with empathy and 
relational reframes. Findings showed the women experienced a significant increase in sadness 
and anxiety after the session, which was understood as due to partially resolving anger, 
making way for other aspects of emerging experience. Such a partial emotion resolution may 
be underpinned by the driving force of primary adaptive emotions: getting in touch with some 
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fundamental human need (i.e., for safety, love, competence, affiliation, nurturance, identity; 
Pascual-Leone & Greenberg, 2007). Therefore, the partial resolution of maladaptive anger, 
followed by increases in sadness or anxiety is in line with a sequential model of the emotional 
change process (Pascual-Leone & Greenberg, 2007).  
These findings have also been recently replicated by findings using an imaginal 
empty-chair dialogue for the resolution of attachment injuries with manifest unresolved anger 
(Narkiss-Guez, Zichor, Guez, & Diamond, 2015). This study demonstrated for 61 participants 
that over the course of relational reframe and imaginal empty-chair dialogue, self-reported 
intensity of (unresolved) anger decreased, whereas intensity of (primary adaptive) sadness at 
the loss and attachment injury increased. Rochman, Diamond and Amir (2008) applied 
acoustical analyses to the vocal quality associated with emotional change, as participants with 
maladaptive anger and sadness underwent a single-session enactment intervention. They 
found greater non-perceptible micro-variations in the pitch of unresolved sadness as compared 
to unresolved (i.e., maladaptive) anger. The average and variability of vocal pitch changed for 
anger, depending on the timing when the anger was evoked, either before or after sadness. 
Taken together, when self-criticism is considered in the context of maladaptive anger, these 
studies suggest that it is the "how" of the inner critic, its tone of voice, its association with 
self-contempt that seems central to be explored further. 
Moreover, clinical theory suggests that individuals with maladaptive anger experience 
more distress, more unresolved emotion (i.e., fear and shame) as an immediate reaction to 
self-criticism than less anger-prone individuals (Greenberg, 2002; Pascual-Leone et al, 2013). 
Diamond and colleagues (2010) suggested that working through self-criticism implied the 
individual eventually acknowledge and experience more vulnerable adaptive feelings, such as 
hurt and also assertive anger. These latter emotions help to articulate fundamental human 
needs in relation to the personal difficulty. For these reasons, it seems reasonable to 
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hypothesize that individuals with maladaptive anger would have more difficulty in identifying 
and articulating their inner needs and then standing up for themselves using healthy 
expressions of assertive anger. 
Current Study 
 The objective of the present study was to investigate the emotional processes in 
individuals vulnerable to anger problems, specifically as they work through their self-
criticism. In doing so, we hypothesized there are specific markers of the emotional process 
which differ between vulnerable and non-vulnerable individuals.  
Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 1 examined the process of self-hate (following Whelton & Greenberg, 
2005) and states that: Individuals with maladaptive anger use more contempt when expressing 
self-criticism, compared to controls. Hypothesis 2 described a depressogenic process: 
Individuals with maladaptive anger respond to their criticism with more fear, shame, or global 
distress, as compared to controls (see Whelton & Greenberg, 2005). Hypothesis 3 
conceptualized the anger process: Although they may express maladaptive forms of anger, 
anger-prone individuals are less likely to be assertive even after being prompted for 
assertiveness (i.e., a specific priming intervention to promote angry assertiveness; see Method 
section). Hypothesis 4 (based on Diamond et al., 2010, and Pascual-Leone & Greenberg, 
2007) assumed a missing need in the resolution of self-criticism in vulnerable individuals: 
Anger-prone individuals are less likely to state an existential need, even after being prompted 
to identify unmet needs (i.e., a specific priming intervention to focus participants on an unmet 
need; see Method section). Finally, hypothesis 5, (based on the emotion-focused model, 
outlined above) assumed that two central emotion variables, fear/shame and 
contemptuousness predict the intensity of maladaptive anger. 
Method 
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Participants 
A total of N = 45 undergraduate students at a Northern American University 
participated in the study. All participants responded to advertisement for the study by 
indicating they suffered problems related to self-criticism (i.e., reported “yes” to the item: 
“Do you tend to criticize yourself, to treat yourself harshly, and get down on yourself about 
your personal short-comings? Yes/No”). Two further screening questions identified those who 
were suffering additional problems related with anger (when both items were coded “yes”) 
and who were not (when both “no”) according to self-report to each of these items: (1) “Are 
you quick to anger, or do you sometimes “blow up” and get upset easily? Yes/No” and (2) 
“Has anyone ever suggested you have an anger problem? Yes/No”). These two further 
screening questions on maladaptive anger were the basis of the differentiation into the two 
groups (ANGER vs control). Participants received a small course credit for their involvement 
in the study. The mean age of the total sample was 21 years. The total sample consisted of 37 
females (82%), 29 (62%) Caucasian, 27 (60%) single (i.e., unmarried) persons. In addition, 27 
(60%) were employed, 18 (40%) had past or present psychotherapy experience, 9 (20%) had 
past or present psychotropic medication. The first group, with problems of self-criticism (but 
without anger problems), included n = 22 students (“control group”), the second group, with 
problems related to both self-criticism and maladaptive anger, included, n = 23 students ( 
“ANGER group”). As shown in Table 1, there were no between-group differences with regard 
to demographic variables or treatment history (i.e., psychotherapy or medication). The mean 
scores on the Beck Depression Inventory – II (Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996) did not differ 
between the groups and the total sample’s score (N = 45) denoted a moderate level of 
depression (14.50). As expected, the two groups differed on their score of maladaptive anger 
on the Anger-Rumination Scale (Sukhodolski, Golub & Cromwell, 2001): as indicated in 
Table 1, the ANGER group presented with higher scores than the control group. In a manner 
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consistent with their selection criteria, the two groups respectively scored within 1 SD above 
vs. 1 SD below the average scores for healthy individuals reported by Sukhodolsky and 
colleagues (2001).  
Instruments 
Symptom and problem inventories.  
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II). The BDI-II (Beck et al., 1996) is a 21-item 
version of the self-reported assessment measure of depressive symptoms. The intensity of 
each symptom is self-reported on a Likert-type scale (0 - 3). A number of studies have 
demonstrated its validity and reliability (e.g., Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988), with high internal 
consistency (Cronbach alpha = .86; Beck & Steer, 1984) and test-retest reliability varying 
between .46 and .90 (Beck, et al., 1988). Internal consistency (Cronbach alpha) for the scale 
based on this sample was .89. 
Anger-Rumination Scale (ARS). The ARS (Sukhodolsky et al., 2001) is a 19-item 
self-report questionnaire is assessing the level of (maladaptive) anger-rumination using a four-
point Likert-type scale ranging between "almost never" (1) and "almost always" (4). There is 
a general score on rumination used in the present study and also four subscales including 
anger afterthoughts, thoughts of revenge, angry memories, and understanding of causes. 
Satisfying convergent and discriminative validity were demonstrated by Sukhodolsky et al. 
(2001) for the entire scale. The current sample presented a Cronbach alpha of .85. 
Manipulation checks. 
Overall, manipulation checks served the central function of verifying that the quasi-
experimental intervention had the expected impact on a participant. As such, not all 
manipulation check measures were actively used in testing the hypotheses on maladaptive 
anger and self-criticism, but rather they served as quality measures of the experimental 
induction of emotional processes. 
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Visual Analogue Scale (VAS). The VAS (Albersnagel, 1988) is a self-report 
questionnaire measuring four affect dimensions, which are dysphoria, hostility, anxiety and 
positive affect, with a total of 16 items. It has proven valid for detecting small changes in 
affect (Albersnagel, 1988). Each dimension is assessed on four items which are to be 
appreciated using a visual analogue scale of 80 mm. lines. They function as continuous 
"barometers" with anchors on both sides, ranging from "not at all" to "extremely." The 
participant needs to place a vertical line at the point corresponding to his or her current 
subjective affective state. The VAS was used to measure the impact on specific emotions of 
the various steps of the quasi-experimental task. A mean score per dimension was computed. 
Cronbach alpha for the current sample was .77. 
State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES). The SSES (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) is a self-
report questionnaire comprising 20 items assessing fluctuations associated with cognitive 
aspects of self-esteem. A 5-point Likert scale was used. Validity of the scale, as well as its 
sensitivity to laboratory manipulations, was shown by Heatherton and Polivy (1991), in 
particular its high internal consistency (Cronbach alpha = .92). The SSES was used to test the 
impact on self-esteem of the imagination step related to failure. An overall mean was 
computed. Cronbach alpha for the current sample was .88. 
Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM). The SAM (Bradley & Lang, 1994) is a self-
assessed instrument using single items to measure the momentary levels of arousal and of 
dominance, using a 9-point Likert scale, ranging, for arousal, from "not excited at all" (1) to 
"very excited (9). The SAM was used to measure the impact on arousal and dominance of the 
various steps of the experimental task. This scale is widely used in emotion research and has 
proven its validity and reliability (e.g., Bradley, Greenwald, Petry, & Lang, 1992).  
Vividness of Visual Imagery (VVIQ). The VVIQ (Marks, 1973) is a 16-item self-
report questionnaire assessing the vividness of an actual imagery, using for the assessment a 
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5-point Likert scale, ranging from "not at all" (1) to "very vivid" (5). The scale presented with 
acceptable construct and criterion-related validity, as well as internal consistency (.88) and 
test-retest reliability (.74; McKelvie, 1995). The present study followed the example of 
Whelton and Greenberg (2005) and only used five items in order to establish an additional 
manipulation check for vividness of the imagination procedure (described below). An overall 
mean was computed. Cronbach alpha for this scale was .83. 
Relevance questionnaire (RQ). The relevance questionnaire (Kramer & Pascual-
Leone, 2013) is a five items-scale aiming at assessing the personal relevance of a specific 
interactional situation. All items must be rated using a Likert-type scale ranging from "not 
relevant at all" (1) to "extremely relevant" (5); a mean score is computed. The RQ aims at 
assessing the link between the contents worked in the session and the person’s daily life. It 
was developed specifically in the context of the present study and no other validity data are 
available, so far. The items apply to the current experimental situation. Internal consistency in 
this study was .78. 
Process measures of emotion. 
Classification of Affective Meaning States (CAMS). The CAMS (Pascual-Leone & 
Greenberg, 2005) is an observer-based rating system for the process-assessment of distinct 
affective-meaning states in therapy sessions, based on a synthesis of current emotion-focused 
theory (i.e., Greenberg and Paivio, 1997) with empirical observations from a series of 
intensive case studies (Pascual-Leone & Greenberg, 2007). The original CAMS assesses 10 
affective-meaning states: global distress, fear/shame, rejecting anger, negative evaluation, 
need, relief, hurt/grief, assertive anger, self-compassion, and acceptance/agency. Because the 
present study focused on a specific sub-set of emotions within a quasi-experimental 
manipulation, we included global distress, fear/shame, rejecting anger, assertive anger, and 
need. Each emotion – or affective-meaning state – is coded according to 5 criteria: (a) 
ANGER AND SELF-CRITICISM  
 
14 
emotion/action tendency (i.e., what is the action tendency observed in the excerpt?), (b) 
expression (i.e., how intense is the arousal in this excerpt; which non-verbal behaviors may be 
observed?); (c) vocal quality (i.e., how can the individual’s voice be described in this 
excerpt?, what is the individual trying to convey using para-verbal aspects?), (d) stance (i.e., 
what is the overall adaptivity of the emotion in this excerpt?), (e) specificity (i.e., in what 
sense is the emotional state observed different from another emotional state?). Inter-rater 
reliability for the 5 CAMS-categories included were assessed using two independent raters on 
n = 17 randomly chosen cases (38% reliability sample). Inter-rater reliabilities for the 
Classification of Affective-Meaning States (CAMS) ranged between kappa = 1.00 and = .57 , 
with an average of .87 (SD = .16).  
Degree of Observed Contempt. For the present study, we developed a coding scheme 
measuring contemptuousness (of the self-criticism). Coding criteria for the scale were based 
on relevant aspects of work by Ekman and Friesen (1978), Gottman, (1994), Rice and Kerr 
(1986), Whelton (2000) and Whelton and Greenberg (2005) and represented an independent 
3-point Likert-type scale measuring the degree of contempt, ranging from 0 (absent), over 1 
(moderately present) to 2 (clearly present). Consistent with the literature, we describe verbal 
manifestations (e.g., insulting comments) and non- and para-verbal manifestations (e.g., head-
shaking, raise of chin, tightness in the eyes, exaggerated sigh; Ekman & Friesen, 1975; 
Whelton & Greenberg, 2005) of contempt. Reliability for this category was assessed using 
two independent raters on n = 17 randomly chosen cases (38% reliability sample). Inter-rater 
reliability of this specific dimension of contemptuousness was ICC (1, 2) = .77. 
Interventions and Procedures 
Structured therapeutic intervention to address self-criticism.  
A formal treatment intervention called the “two-chair task” borrowed from emotion-
focused therapy (Elliott et al., 2004; Greenberg, 2002) was modified and standardized for 
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experimental procedures (see procedures, below steps 2, 3, and 5). Because of a computerized 
recruitment procedure, the person who facilitated the intervention was blind to the condition 
each participant was in (ANGER/control). 
 The research procedure was comprised of five parts, all within a session of 
approximately 50 minutes in total. The five parts were punctuated by two intermediate 
manipulation checks, as well as assessments at pre- and post-intervention (see figure 1 for a 
schematic overview and timeline for all procedures and all assessment points). The entire 
process was video-recorded, after a written consent was obtained.  
 (1) Mood induction. After the pre-intervention assessment (Assessment 1; Table 2), 
the participants were given a mood induction task and asked to imagine a specific situation of 
failure from their lives; with the following instruction: "Try to remember a specific time in 
your life when you’ve failed at something. It may have been because you did something 
wrong, or maybe you just didn’t do something that was needed at that time. Try to remember: 
What was going on? What was at stake? What were you hoping for? What did it feel like to 
be you at that moment?" The participants were given time to silently imagine as part of the 
guided activity. After 5 minutes, manipulation check questionnaires were given (VAS, SSES, 
SAM, and Vividness Scale; Assessment 2; Table 2). 
 (2) Self-critical voice. The participants were then asked to change chairs and face the 
empty chair they had been in for the imagination task. We then gave the following instruction: 
"Every person has a side of themselves which watches, monitors, and evaluates what they do. 
What people criticize themselves for is different from person to person, but usually we all 
have some version of this self-critical voice in our heads. Now I am going to ask you to ‘be 
that voice.’ Imagine yourself where you were, sitting in that chair [across from participant], 
and that from where you sit now you are this critical judging part of yourself. Try saying out 
loud to him/her whatever the judging voice would say about the failure. Be that judging voice 
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now and tell [insert name of participant] what you have to say." (adapted from Whelton & 
Greenberg, 2005, p. 1587). This process was given 5 minutes. The clinical researcher 
provided empathic support encouraging the process of describing the emotional processes in 
detail, however, no content-related interventions were made. 
 (3) Initial reaction. Right after this, we asked the participants to change chairs back 
again and gave the instruction: "Here you are [insert name of participant]: What is it like to be 
on the receiving end of this message? You are now facing your critic right over there. How do 
you respond? What do you want to say in reaction to this criticism?" (adapted from Whelton 
& Greenberg, 2005, p. 1587). The participant was given 5 minutes to respond, followed by a 
manipulation check (Assessment 3; Table 2). 
(4) Written priming task. Without leaving the context of the self-criticism task, 
participants were given the sentence completion task for priming emotion. This served as a 
written micro-intervention (Pascual-Leone, 2010) to facilitate self-assertion in relation to their 
critical voice. To offer increased standardization and structure of a therapeutic task within our 
quasi-experimental design, we made use of a strategically timed sentence completion task to 
prompt healthy (i.e., primary adaptive) emotion. The sentence completion task for priming 
emotion (Pascual-Leone, 2010) is a two page written exercise specifically designed to help 
participants do two things: (1) identify an unmet existential need and (2) to prompt assertion 
Therefore, it is consistent with the sequential model of emotional change (Pascual-Leone & 
Greenberg, 2007) which posits the facilitation of primary adaptive emotions (e.g., assertive 
anger) through access to a congruent existential need. This written task aims at putting 
participants in the mindset for assertive anger and the notion of standing up for oneself and 
expressing one's need. On the first page (part 1), participants were prompted to: “Consider 
what you needed most (or still need) in relation to the personal difficulty or failure (see step 
1).” The tool then asks participants to choose from a list of possible needs and “briefly explain 
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or elaborate why you identified the above needs.” On the second page (part 2), participants 
were asked to complete a series of 3-4 sentence stems designed to promote assertive anger in 
the service of a clearly identified existential need. Participants were explicitly told: “The 
purpose of these incomplete sentence stems is to help inspire you (if they apply) when you 
work on responding to your critic” regarding the personal failure you identified. Sentence 
stems asked participants to complete, in written form, sentences such as: "My anger is 
constructive because...", "I have the right to be assertive because I...", "I will fight for...". This 
induction phase lasted less than five minutes. The instrument, which was used as an 
intervention, rather than an assessment tool, was developed based on clinical examples given 
in the CAMS measure (Pascual-Leone & Greenberg, 2005) and has received empirical 
support as a tool for priming emotion in an experimental design with a student sample 
(Rohde, Stein, Pascual-Leone, & Caspar, in press). Copies of the tool are available by 
contacting [insert second author’s email] or going to [insert website]. 
  (5) Reaction following priming. After this short written task, designed to assist 
participants in responding adaptively to their critic, participants were asked to re-enter the 
self-critical dialogue in the same chair as they were in step (3) with the following instruction: 
"Let's come back to the dialogue. Using the notes you have just written, try again to imagine 
your critic sitting here confronting you from that chair over there. So like before, you are 
[insert name of participant] and have been on the receiving end of this message. What do you 
want to say in reaction to the criticism?" The participant was given 5 minutes to respond 
followed by a (final) manipulation check (Assessment 4; Table 2).  
In the last step (6), participants were debriefed about the objectives and methods of the 
study. Because such a two-chair dialogue can have a powerful impact on the person’s 
experience of him or herself, the researcher offered time for a supportive debriefing/ 
discussion and provided all participants with a referral list for psychological services. 
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Procedures for coding emotion. 
 As indicated in figure 1, three different moments were coded using two coding 
schemes. Firstly, the self-critical voice (participant in the critical chair; procedure step #2) 
was coded only using the contemptuousness criteria (see above). Secondly, the immediate 
reaction (procedure step #3) was coded using the five selection categories from the CAMS 
and thirdly, the reaction following priming (procedure step #5) was coded independently 
using the same categories from the CAMS. Reliability was calculated separately on 
contemptuousness and on CAMS-codes. 
Statistical analyses 
In order to assess between-group differences on emotional processing, t-tests for all 
continuous variables and χ2 for all dichotomous variables were applied; McNemar tests were 
used to test within-sample (pre-/post-priming) dichotomous variables. All χ2 at the level of the 
reaction following priming took into account the initial frequency of the corresponding 
affective meaning state. Two potential predictors of maladaptive anger (-rumination) were 
examined, i.e., fear/shame and contemptuousness, using a hierarchical step-wise regression 
analysis, in order to test the predictive value of each of the core emotion variables. 
Bonferroni’s corrections were applied where necessary, by adjusting the p-value for the 
number of tests. 
Results 
Manipulation checks 
 Preliminary analyses showed that all relevant variables were comparable between the 
two samples at pre-intervention, except for the level of maladaptive anger-rumination, as 
anticipated by group selection criteria (Table 1). Manipulation checks comparing the three 
assessment points (times: 2, 3, 4) with the pre-intervention levels (assessment 1) showed 
satisfactory results for all variables, confirming the desired impact of each shift in process 
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according as indicated by procedures (Table 2, time effects). Vividness of the imagery was 
high in both groups, with no between-group differences, which means that the initial mood 
induction worked well across groups. In addition, there were no between-group differences at 
any time-point with regard to the affective variables, as measured on the VAS, as well as the 
cognitive component of self-esteem (SSES). However, all these variables differed between 
pre-intervention (time 1) and assessment at time 2 (right after the imagination task) and 
assessment time 3 (right after the initial reaction), in the direction assumed, which means that 
the imagination task and the two-chair dialogue had the expected emotional impact on the 
participants. 
 Ratings on the SAM indicated that firstly, dominance was rated lower by individuals 
in the group ANGER, compared to controls; low dominance may be interpreted as low 
confidence or assertiveness; alternatively, low dominance may be related to secondary 
helplessness. Whereas these between-group differences vanished across the experiment, the 
levels for both groups increased between assessment times 1 and 4, meaning that participants 
went from feeling relatively “small, weak, and not in control” to relatively “big, strong, and in 
control.” This attests to an effect of the clinical-experimental procedures, as predicted. The 
arousal dimension indicated all participants were moderately aroused and this was maintained 
over the entire experiment. This indicates what is presumed to be a constant and moderate 
emotional engagement of the individuals with the task. Related to this, self-reports showed the 
personal relevance of content participants worked on was systematically rated as "very high" 
by individuals, and to an equal degree across the two groups. 
 It should also be noted that no participants refused to engage in the two-chair 
enactment task. 
Emotional Processing associated with self-criticism 
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 Between-group differences testing confirmed that anger-prone individuals expressed 
higher levels of contemptuousness during their self-criticism (in step 2 of the experiment; see 
figure 1), when compared to the controls (t(1, 44) = 3.65, p < .05, see Table 3), with a 
medium effect (d = 0.57). This confirmed the first hypothesis on self-hate, that anger-prone 
individuals were more self-contemptuous. 
 A series of Chi-Square tests on the depressogenic (hypothesis 2) and anger (hypothesis 
3) processes did not yield any between-group differences, in particular when controlled for 
the number of tests. This observation was true for the initial reaction, which corresponds to 
step 3 of the experiment, and for the reaction following priming, which corresponds to step 5 
of the experiment (see Table 3; Figure 1). This means that both participants with anger-
problems and without processed depressogenic and anger issues in a similar fashion when 
working through self-criticism. 
As part of an additional manipulation check, we observed, as anticipated, that 
depressogenic emotions (global distress and fear/shame) decreased between the initial 
reaction and the second reaction after participants were encouraged to focus on their unmet 
needs, and offered a structured task to prompt assertive anger (McNemar tests significant at p 
= .05). By the same token, the priming task was also followed by corresponding increases in 
healthy assertive anger (McNemar test significant at p = .05). This means that the priming 
task, as expected, helped all individuals to use assertive anger and to let go of some of the less 
helpful global distress, fear, and shame. Interestingly, throughout the task, rejecting anger was 
almost absent, to the same extent in both groups (McNemar test not significant at p = .05). 
 Finally, we tested the missing need-hypothesis and found a between-group difference 
supporting our assumption. Whereas in the initial reaction (step 3 of the experiment) to self-
criticism, no individuals spontaneously expressed any existential need, after the short priming 
intervention (sentence completion task in step 4), some participants were able to make use of 
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the intervention (McNemar test significant at p = .05). However, anger-prone individuals 
were less expressive of their existential needs as compared to the controls (χ2 (1) = 5.35; p = 
.02; see Table 3) in their reaction following that priming (step 5 of the experiment). Figure 2 
illustrates key information from Table 3, showing the experience of distress and the 
articulation of an existential need over time and how it differed between groups. 
Process Predictors of Maladaptive Anger 
 Finally, we explored observable in-session processes as predictors for reported 
maladaptive anger-rumination and it appeared that two factors were promising: the initial 
level of contemptuousness associated with self-criticism and the overall presence of fear 
and/or shame (across both time-points; see Table 4). In a hierarchical step-wise regression 
analysis, it appeared that the most parsimonious model, using self-contemptuousness as sole 
predictor, explained 13% of the variance of maladaptive anger-rumination. This means that 
the intensity of self-contemptuousness predicts significantly the problems related with 
maladaptive anger-rumination. 
Discussion 
 This quasi-experimental study focused on the process of working with self-criticism 
by using a short, clinically relevant intervention that draws on the subjective moment-by-
moment experiences of individuals who either do or do not have a propensity toward problem 
anger. The purpose of this study was not to demonstrate the outcome of an intervention task, 
but rather to examine the process of emotional change as measured by specific observer-rated 
indices. The results of this study partially supported our hypotheses. 
The elusive power of contempt 
 The presence of assertive anger did not offer an observable difference between groups, 
on either time points where it may have appeared. This result confirmed the comparability of 
groups and also the relevance of the priming task aiming at the promotion of assertive anger. 
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More specifically, the expression of self-critical content was manifested with a different tone 
of voice and manner among individuals with maladaptive anger as compared to controls: they 
expressed more self-hate in the form of contemptuousness. This may involve using insults 
against oneself, but also using more non-verbal and para-verbal indices of contempt (i.e., 
head-shaking, raise of chin, tightness in the eyes, exaggerated sigh; Ekman & Friesen, 1975; 
Whelton & Greenberg, 2005). Our results suggested that contempt can be understood as a 
major way in which anger is expressed toward oneself during the process of self-criticism. In 
particular, a hierarchical linear regression confirmed the importance of moment-by-moment 
contemptuousness for predicting maladaptive anger-rumination: the more contemptuous one 
was when working through one’s self-criticism, the more problems one had with anger-
rumination. In line with Whelton and Greenberg (2005), we may speculate that it might not be 
the cognitive-verbal content (i.e., the negative belief) that is most related to 
problematic/maladaptive anger, but rather the expressed emotion of contempt, and in 
particular its non-verbal markers. More research is needed specifically on non-verbal aspects 
of contemptuousness. 
Self-contempt and -loathing are often covert emotional processes that are not easily 
measurable without an individual's minimum affective involvement in some target task, as 
done in the present study. As example, a study on neural correlates, performed by Longe and 
colleagues (2010), tried to elicit self-criticism in individuals using cognitive tasks, but was 
unable to show effects either with regard to self-contempt, or with regard to a biological 
network generally associated with self-loathing and harsh self-criticism, i.e., the anterior 
insular-formation (Calder, Lawrence, & Young, 2001; Doerig et al., 2013). This null effect 
may be attributed to a lack of emotional engagement on behalf of the participants, as 
suggested by Doerig and colleagues (2013). The two-chair task used in the present study 
made it possible to study moderately aroused emotion in an optimal way and to disentangle 
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the emotional stimulus (i.e., the critical voice) from the experiential response (i.e., fear, 
shame, and in healthy controls, the emergence of an existential need). Therefore, a meaningful 
direction for future research would be to conduct a more systematic investigation, by using 
the same emotion-evoking task and process research methods, to study contempt and its 
relationship with various mental disorders.  
The importance of knowing what you need 
 This study not only investigated the actual quality of self-criticism using observational 
process indices of contempt, but also individual’s dynamic and moment-by-moment felt 
reactions to that self-criticism. Our methods did not show differences between groups in 
depressogenic and anger-related processes, as such. However, we showed that individuals 
with maladaptive anger were less likely to fully access and articulate an existential or 
interpersonal need, even when they were given prompts to do so. This means that the presence 
of maladaptive anger might impede on the individual’s capacity in accessing the underlying 
need. The sentence completion task (Pascual-Leone, 2010) was designed to prime access to 
healthy assertive anger (which was successful per se with most individuals from both groups) 
and to articulate the idiosyncratic need that underlies that emotional process. These unmet 
existential needs could be for recognition, acceptance, affiliation, nurturance, support or 
autonomy, among others (Pascual-Leone, 2010), depending on the specific situation of failure 
that each individual was encouraged to work on during the quasi-experimental task. 
According to emotion-focused theory, an unmet need is what orients and drives primary 
adaptive emotional experience (Greenberg & Paivio, 1997).  
Despite the priming intervention, which also aimed to explicitly orient all participants 
toward articulating their underlying needs, only a small number of individuals with 
maladaptive anger were able to clearly express their needs as compared to controls. One 
explanation for why people prone to anger seem to have difficulty symbolizing their needs is 
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that it may have to do with the inherently undifferentiated nature of problem anger. In a paper 
dedicated to the conceptualization of various anger problems, Pascual-Leone and colleagues 
(2013) argue that a key issue characterizing problematic or maladaptive anger is the degree to 
which it has poorly differentiated and relatively unspecified concerns. Despite sometimes 
high arousal, problematic anger all too often entails less specificity than more adaptive 
experiences, such as assertive anger. Hate, disgust, contempt as forms of rejecting anger, tend 
to be clear expressions of what one does not want, but as experiences they offer little direction 
about what goals or needs to pursue. Otherwise said, “if a client is unclear (in the moment) 
about what he or she is ‘fighting for,’ the presenting experience of anger is not likely to be 
primary and assertive anger” (Pascual-Leone et al., 2013; p. 89). Thus, one could speculate 
that being able to articulate one’s unmet need is antithetical to unresolved or problematic 
anger. One might argue that people with problematic anger are less differentiated in their 
emotional experience at large, and particularly when they are angry (or actively self-hating), 
and this would explain the apparent difficulty they have in identifying and symbolizing core 
unmet existential needs in relation to a personal problem, as observed in the present study. 
These results are consistent with conclusions drawn by McMain, Goldman and Greenberg 
(1996) in the context of emotion-focused therapy for resolving long standing interpersonal 
difficulties, who reported that expressing an existential need was a better predictor of therapy 
outcome than narrative changes such as developing a new view of the other. 
The emotional awareness that allows one to symbolize what one needs is understood 
as a core process in psychotherapy, in particular emotion-focused therapy. Without this 
process clients often fail to make progress in working with their difficulty. This may lead 
either to emotional collapse, retreat or angry outbursts (Pascual-Leone, 2009; Pascual-Leone 
& Paivio, 2013). The absence of access to an existential need may potentially have far-
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reaching consequences in individuals with maladaptive anger. More research is needed to 
delineate these consequences, in particular by using longitudinal designs. 
Clinical implications for practice 
The specific emotional processes related to self-criticism in anger-prone individuals 
bear several clinical implications. Firstly, the present study underlines the centrality of 
emotional processing when working through self-criticism. It may not be sufficient to train 
self-critical people with maladaptive anger to challenge their dysfunctional thinking. In order 
for these individuals to benefit more generally from a therapeutic intervention, it must take 
into account the psychological, and mostly affective, determinants of self-criticism. Secondly, 
it may be useful to train people to develop their self-compassion and self-assertion, as 
proposed by Gilbert and Procter (2006), among others. Still, in addition to cultivating a 
generally self-compassionate attitude, it seems that identifying and promoting access to a 
specific existential need in the service of assertion among other primary adaptive emotions, 
will be particularly important for people with maladaptive anger. Our results suggest that 
some kind of process-focused, rather than content-focused, therapeutic intervention seems 
necessary in order to develop inner strength (i.e., identifying and affirming genuine needs) to 
effectively soften the harshness of punitive self-criticism (Kannan & Levitt, 2013). Such a 
process-focused therapy approach would pick up directly verbal and non-verbal aspects of 
contemptuousness in the process, as well as the lacking process-access to the underlying need. 
One example of how to do this would be taking into account – and delineating in their 
emotional implications – the different inner voices related to self-criticism (Greenberg, 2002; 
Stinckens, Lietaer & Leijssen, 2013).  
When using such two-chair dialogues in resolving self-criticism in the context of 
problematic anger, the clinician should particularly pay attention to the experiential access of 
the underlying need, and not be satisfied with distant descriptions of the “need”, but help the 
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client to actively live the situation of a missing need “from within”, experientially. So the 
clinicians needs here some micro-skills in step-by-step guiding – and following – the client to 
this core aspect of the resolution of self-criticism (Greenberg, 2002). 
Limitations and future research directions  
 While the present study represents a single session structured intervention to address a 
clinically relevant concern identified by participants, it was not conducted in a clinical context 
of help-seeking. In order to extend our conclusions to individuals with clinical problems, 
further study should be carried out on patient populations. Regarding this, a number of 
participants (40%) reported prior experience with being in psychotherapy which might have 
had an impact on the quality of processes observed in-session. One can speculate that 
participants with the same presenting difficulties, who had been even less familiar with the 
roles and nature of the therapeutic process, may have shown even less optimal processes. 
Similarly, 82% of the participants were female which limits the scope of generalizability of 
the findings to male participants; a future study might investigate the gender effect on the 
resolution process of self-criticism in the context of anger, aiming at disentangling what might 
be partially gender-specific in this process (Fernandez & Malley-Morrison, 2013).  
There was no formal follow-up data in this study and testing for longer-term effects of 
the intervention components (i.e., self-critical dialogue, or sentence completion task for 
priming emotion) was not among the objectives of this study, although it would be useful in 
subsequent research. 
Conclusions 
Despite certain limitations, the present study confirmed the pivotal role of self-
contempt in the experiential elaboration of self-criticism, in general and in particular in the 
context of maladaptive anger. In addition, it is feasible to investigate emotional processing in 
a controlled and valid fashion in a quasi-experimental design using individually-relevant 
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stimuli to activate emotion. To that end, we have also provided specific empirical support for 
the clinically relevant impact of a sentence completion task as a tool designed for priming 
assertive anger and focusing individuals on their unmet needs (Pascual-Leone, 2010). Finally, 
our main conclusion was that there is a specific emotional processing profile for anger-prone 
individuals when they are working through their self-criticism. People who reported having 
anger problems tended to express marked self-contempt and had specific difficulties in 
accessing or articulating their underlying personal needs, which had important implications 
for resolving self-criticism. 
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Table 1 
Characteristics of the Participants in Anger-Prone vs Control Conditions (N = 45) 
 
Variables 
Condition  
 
 
 ANGER (n = 23) Control (n = 22) 
 N (%) N (%) χ2 p-value 
Gender: Female 
Ethnicity 
     Caucasian  
     Asian  
     Other ethnic groups 
Marital status 
     Single 
     Partnered/Married 
     Separated/Divorced 
Employment 
Past Psychotherapy 
Past Medication 
17 (74) 
 
13 (57) 
5 (22) 
5 (22)0 (0) 
 
16 (70) 
6 (26) 
1 (4) 
11(48) 
12 (52) 
7 (30) 
20 (91) 
 
16 (73) 
3 (14) 
1 (5)2 (9) 
 
11 (50) 
11 (50) 
0 (0) 
16 (72) 
6 (27) 
2 (9) 
2.22 
5.79 
 
 
 
3.38 
 
 
 
2.91 
2.91 
3.20 
.14 
.22 
 
 
 
.19 
 
 
 
.09 
.09 
.08 
 M (SD) M (SD) t (1, 43)  p-value 
Age 
BDI 
ARS 
21.30 (3.23) 
16.35 (7.76) 
39.74 (7.10) 
21.63 (3.35) 
13.05 (9.54) 
34.64 (8.72) 
0.34 
-1.28 
-2.16 
.74 
.21 
.03 
 
Note. BDI: Beck Depression Inventory - II. ARS: Anger Rumination Scale. ANGER: anger-
prone individuals 
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Table 2 
Manipulation checks per group and over time 
 
 
 
Groups 
Group - effect 
ANOVAs 
Time - effect 
 
ANGER (n = 23) Control (n = 22) F ES t ES 
Assessment 1: Baseline 
 VAS - dysphoria 
 VAS - hostility 
 VAS - anxiety 
 VAS - positive 
 SSES 
 SAM - arousal 
 SAM - dominance 
 
29.75 (23.84) 
17.23 (15.66) 
33.17 (18.68) 
51.83 (14.41) 
2.98 (0.64) 
4.52 (1.47) 
4.57 (1.85) 
 
22.75 (3.45) 
17.36 (15.77) 
32.27 (21.19) 
56.23 (13.78) 
2.77 (0.63) 
4.68 (1.42) 
5.68 (1.46) 
 
1.32 
.00 
.02 
1.10 
1.22 
0.14 
5.01* 
 
0.41 
0.01 
0.05 
0.31 
0.33 
0.11 
0.66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assessment 2 
 VAS - dysphoria 
 VAS - hostility 
 VAS - anxiety 
 VAS - positive 
 SSES 
 SAM - arousal 
 SAM - dominance 
 Vividness 
 
48.52 (23.08) 
40.50 (19.97) 
47.57 (18.21) 
33.75 (15.73) 
3.47 (0.86) 
4.52 (1.53) 
3.70 (1.79) 
3.73 (0.87) 
 
45.34 (19.79) 
33.61 (22.40) 
46.64 (21.65) 
36.95 (16.84) 
3.12 (0.75) 
4.45 (2.04) 
4.50  (1.82) 
3.95 (0.71) 
 
 0.25 
1.19 
0.02 
0.43 
 2.10 
0.02 
2.23 
0.82 
 
0.15 
0.33 
0.05 
0.20 
0.43 
0.04 
0.44 
0.28 
 
-8.42** 
-6.61** 
-5.05** 
9.36** 
-6.43** 
0.37 
6.03** 
n/a 
 
0.99 
1.07 
0.73 
1.23 
0.57 
0.07 
0.57 
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Note. ANGER: Anger-prone individuals; VAS: Visual Analogue Scale; SSES: State Self-
Esteem Scale; SAM: Self-Assessment Manikin. Time effects (for assessment at times 2, 3, 4) 
in comparison with Baseline assessment at time 1). Other explanations in the text; ** p < .01; 
* p < .05. 
 
 
 
cont’d Table 2 
Assessment 3 
 VAS - dysphoria 
 VAS - hostility 
 VAS - anxiety 
 VAS - positive 
 SSES 
 SAM - arousal 
 SAM - dominance 
 
 
51.80 (22.88) 
42.37 (20.87) 
57.49 (24.51) 
33.37 (18.29) 
3.37 (0.86) 
5.48 (2.29) 
3.83 (2.19) 
 
 
47.81 (23.70) 
38.57 (22.89) 
49.00 (19.82) 
33.47 (17.52) 
3.27 (0.72) 
5.00 (2.12) 
4.32 (2.03) 
 
 
0.33 
0.34 
1.44 
0.34 
0.18 
0.53 
0.61 
 
 
0.17 
0.17 
0.38 
0.00 
0.13 
0.22 
0.23 
 
 
-8.21** 
-7.24** 
-6.16** 
9.27** 
-5.87** 
-1.62 
4.56** 
 
 
1.08 
1.23 
0.99 
1.38 
0.62 
0.34 
0.54 
Assessment 4 
 VAS - dysphoria 
 VAS - hostility 
 VAS - anxiety 
 VAS - positive 
 SSES  
 SAM - arousal  
 SAM - dominance 
 Relevance 
 
31.70 (14.93) 
26.41 (17.46) 
36.33 (19.43) 
47.24 (16.00) 
2.72 (0.65) 
4.70 (2.20) 
5.39 (2.02) 
4.12 (0.74) 
 
28.89 (20.92) 
21.42 (15.71) 
29.67 (20.41) 
54.03 (14.00) 
2.64 (0.74) 
4.86 (1.81) 
6.09 (1.85) 
4.35 (0.54) 
 
0.27 
1.01 
1.26 
2.29 
0.14 
0.08 
1.47 
1.35 
 
0.16 
0.30 
0.33 
0.45 
0.12 
0.08 
0.36 
0.36 
 
-1.54 
-2.71** 
-.10 
1.30 
2.76** 
-.53 
-3.01** 
n/a 
 
0.21 
0.42 
0.02 
0.23 
0.30 
0.34 
0.33 
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Table 3 
Emotional Processing for each group and step of the experiment (N = 45) 
 
Variables 
Group  
 
 
 ANGER (n = 23) Control (n = 22) 
 M (SD)   M (SD) t (1, 44) d 
Self-Criticism (step 2) 
 Contemptuousness 
 
  
1.09 (0.73) 
 
0.64 (0.85) 
 
3.65* 
 
0.57 
 N (%) N (%) χ2 p-value  
Initial Reaction (step 3) 
 Global Distress 
 Fear/Shame 
 Rejecting Anger 
 Assertive Anger 
 Existential Need 
 
18 (78) 
14 (61) 
3 (13) 
2 (9) 
0 (0) 
 
21 (95) 
14 (64) 
1 (5) 
2 (9) 
0 (0) 
 
2.88 
0.04 
1.00 
0.00 
n/a 
 
.09 
.85 
.32 
.96 
 
Reaction post-priming (step 5) 
 Global Distress 
 Fear/Shame 
 Rejecting Anger 
 Assertive Anger 
 Existential Need 
 
3 (13) 
2 (9) 
1 (4) 
20 (87) 
10 (43) 
 
1 (5) 
1 (5) 
2 (9) 
18 (68) 
17 (77) 
 
1.00 
0.31 
0.41 
0.23 
5.35 
  
.32 
.52 
.48 
.47 
.02* 
Note. For the reaction following priming, all χ2 analyses took into account the initial 
frequency of the corresponding affective meaning state at the level of the initial reaction as 
expected frequency; * p < .05. Differences between step 3 and step 5 significant at the p = .05 
significance level for Global Distress, Fear/Shame and Assertive Anger (McNemar).  
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Table 4 
Predictors of Maladaptive Anger-Rumination using Hierarchical Regression (N = 45) 
Model R2 B SE β t p 
Predicting ARS 
Total Fear/Shame 
Contemptuousness 
.15  
1.80 
3.52 
 
2.01 
1.51 
 
.13 
.34 
 
.90 
2.33 
 
.37 
.03* 
Predicting ARS 
Contemptuousness 
.13  
3.76 
 
1.48 
 
.36 
 
2.54 
 
.01* 
 
Note: ARS: Anger Rumination Scale; * p < .05  
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Figure 1. Overall Procedures and Assessment schedule of the experiment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. “Manipulation checks” given at baseline (1), assessment points 2 and 3 and Discharge (4): at all time points: Visual Analogue Scale; State 
Self-Esteem Scale; Self-Assessment Manikin. “Symptom Inventories” given only at assessment point 1: Beck Depression Inventory and Anger-
Rumination Scale. CAMS: Classification of Affective Meaning States (only 5 categories: global distress, fear/shame, rejecting anger, assertive 
anger and need). 
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Figure 2. The experience of distress and the articulation of an existential need 
 
Note. Both variables (frequency of Global Distress and Existential Need, for both groups) 
were significantly different across time between the Initial Reaction (time 1) and the Reaction 
after Priming (time 2), all p’s < .05; A significant between group effect was found for the 
expression of existential needs, * = p < .05 
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